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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Charline J. Bobolack appeals from the district court’s order on the state’s 
motion in limine and from the district court’s order affirming the judgment of 
conviction. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Bobolack was involved in a profane verbal altercation near a bowling 
alley.  (Tr., p. 52, L. 14 – p. 76, L. 9.)  She was subsequently charged with 
disturbing the peace in Ada County Case number CR-MD-2015-0004113. 
(R., pp. 5-7, 44-45.)  The complaint alleged that Bobolack “did willfully and 
maliciously disturb the peace or quiet of a person, Sara Giambruno, by engaging 
in offensive conduct in a loud and boisterous manner.”  (R., pp. 44-45.) 
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking an order “precluding 
the defendant from producing any evidence related to the (1) victim’s criminal 
history and current status as a supervised probationer, (2) allegations as to the 
victim stalking the Defendant, (3) allegations as to the victim vandalizing the 
Defendant’s property, and (4) allegations as to the victim harassing or 
threatening the Defendant.”  (R., pp. 37-39.)  The parties agreed to exclude the 
first category of evidence, but contested whether the latter three categories of 
alleged stalking, vandalism, and harassment evidence—referred to below and 
herein as the “stalking evidence”—should be allowed at trial.  (See R., p. 41; 
Tr., p. 5, L. 16 – p. 6, L. 1.) 
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The state’s motion was heard the morning of trial.  (Tr., pp. 4-18.)  The 
magistrate did not specifically hold whether he was affirming or denying the 
motion, but he effectively denied the motion to the extent he allowed the parties 
to bring up the stalking evidence, because he concluded the parties “have a right 
to get into there’s a history between these folks, and they don’t like each other.”  
(Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-25.)  The magistrate further determined that “you can say, you 
know, that – that the mind set [Bobolack] carried was that there had been some 
damage done to some of her property along the way, and she had a suspicion 
that it was so and so that did it, and that’s all we’re going to do.”  (Tr., p. 13, 
Ls. 18-22.) 
However, the magistrate also ruled that he would exclude police reports 
related to the alleged stalking, and further reserved ruling on the limits of the 
stalking evidence that he would allow.  (See Tr., p. 14, Ls. 15-22; p. 17, L. 18 – 
p. 18, L. 2.)  He concluded that: 
Now – so, I mean, I don’t know how – is that – this is one of those 
things that I – I can’t really give you a definitive I’m going to allow 
that question, not allow this question, as we – as we sit here right 
now. I think I need to play it as we go. 
 
But just so you both know, I think once the point’s been made that, 
you know, there’s a level of distrust, or a level of fear, or whatever 
back and forth here, then that’s as far as we need to get. And so, 
that will be my judgment at the time. 
 
(Tr., pp. 17, L. 18 – p. 18, L. 2.) 
 Bobolack was found guilty after trial.  (Tr., p. 193, Ls.1-8.)  She appealed 
to the district court, arguing that the magistrate erred in “partially granting” the 
state’s motion in limine, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
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jury’s verdict.  (R., pp. 79-82, 107-116.)  The district court disagreed and affirmed 
the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp. 136-146.) 





Bobolack states the issues on appeal as: 
 
A. Did the District Court err in affirming the trial court’s partial grant of the 
State’s motion in limine excluding relevant evidence regarding the 
relationship between Ms. Bobolack and Ms. Giambruno? 
 
B. Did the District Court err in affirming the jury’s verdict? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
I. Has Bobolack failed to show the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate’s ruling on the state’s motion in limine? 
 









Bobolack Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The 
Magistrate Ruling On The State’s Motion In Limine 
 
A. Introduction 
 Bobolack argues on appeal that the district court “erred in affirming the 
trial court’s [] partial grant of the State’s motion in limine excluding relevant 
evidence regarding the relationship between Bobolack and Giambruno.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  Specifically, she contends that the trial court erroneously 
excluded the stalking evidence, which was “relevant to [her] state of mind” during 
the encounter with Giambruno.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  She further claims 
the stalking evidence would have tended to show that she did not maliciously 
and willfully disturb Giambruno’s peace.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) 
 This argument fails for several reasons.  First, Bobolack has not shown 
that the magistrate’s order was adverse to her, and therefore cannot show that 
the order is subject to challenge on appeal.  Second, even if the order was 
adverse, Bobolack did not make an offer of proof of any evidence that was 
actually excluded below, and thus has not preserved this issue for appeal.  Third, 
even if Bobolack has successfully preserved this issue on appeal, the magistrate 
correctly limited the introduction of evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403. Lastly, even 
if the magistrate’s order was appealable and erroneous, it was harmless. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision” when the district 
court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity.  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 
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711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  This Court reviews the magistrate record “to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law 
follow from those findings.”  Id.  “If those findings are so supported and the 
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s 
decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as a matter of 
procedure.”  Id; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981). 
Trial courts are afforded broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine.  
Gunter v. Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005).  
Consequently, this Court reviews decisions to grant or deny motions in limine 
with an abuse of discretion standard.  Id. Likewise, a “lower court’s determination 
under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an 
abuse of discretion.” State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d 754, 760 
(Ct. App. 2011). 
 
C. Bobolack Has Failed To Show An Adverse Ruling Subject To Challenge 
On Appeal 
 
It is well settled “that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the 
record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of 
error.”  Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cty. Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236, 
245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010); see also State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557, 
224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) (“In order for an issue to be raised on 
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appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for the 
assignment of error.”). 
The magistrate effectively denied the state’s motion in limine, which 
sought “an Order precluding the defendant from producing any evidence related 
to” the stalking allegations.  (R., p. 37.)  While the magistrate did not state 
outright whether he was granting or denying the motion (see Tr., pp. 13-18),  he 
concluded that the bowling-alley incident did not “have to come up in a vacuum” 
(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-8) and accordingly reasoned that allowing testimonial evidence 
of stalking and vandalism would be appropriate: 
I think, you know, either by way of cross-examination of 
Ms. Giambruno or by direct testimony from your witness, I mean, 
you can say, you know, that – that the mind set she carried was 
that there had been some damage done to some of her property 
along the way, and she had a suspicion that it was so and so that 
did it, and that’s all we’re going to do. 
 
(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 16-22.)  The magistrate found that this sort of evidence should be 
allowed, because “we have to let them give a flavor for who these people are 
and where we – where they are,” and “you have a right to get into there’s a 
history between these folks, and they don’t like each other.”  (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-24; 
p. 14, Ls. 4-6.)  
The magistrate indicated limits on the stalking evidence he would allow, 
by giving examples of the kind of in-depth testimony that he did not “want to get 
into.”  (Tr., p. 13, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 2.)  The magistrate stated he would not allow 
evidence as detailed as testimony that “[Bobolack] had a 7 – 17 inch scratch 
mark on [her] car, June 2nd this happened, June 3rd this happened,” for 
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example.1  (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 23-25.)  But he also reserved ruling on precisely where 
this limit would be, stating that “I can’t really give you a definitive I’m going to 
allow that question, not allow this question, as we – as we sit here right now. I 
think I need to play it as we go.”  (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 19-22.)  The magistrate thus 
reserved ruling on the outer limits of what he would allow: 
So, I’m going to judge it as we go along. But once I feel like the 
points been made, then we’re going to shut that part down. I mean, 
I’ll give you both some latitude to – to go back and forth on it, but 
we’re not going to have, you know, a three-hour sub-trial on – on 
who’s at fault in a – in a domestic situation gone bad. That’s not 
going to be – that’s not on the table today, so. 
 
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-14.)  
 Bobolack’s challenge to the magistrate’s ruling fails at the outset because 
she has not shown that it was adverse to her.  The state sought to prevent the 
production of “any evidence related to” the stalking allegations, and this request 
was effectively denied, as the court plainly ruled that this evidence could be 
introduced.  (See, e.g., Tr., p. 13, Ls. 15-22.)  While the magistrate also ruled 
that police reports were to be excluded from evidence, Bobolack made no 
discernible objection to excluding police reports at trial.  (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 15-22.)  
Lastly, the magistrate expressly reserved ruling on the limits of what it would 
allow into evidence, finding that “I think I need to play it as we go.”  (Tr., p. 17, 
Ls. 18-22.)  In sum, the magistrate’s pretrial ruling—consisting of an effective 
denial of the state’s motion, a narrow exclusion that was uncontested at trial, and 
                                            
1 These appear to be purely hypothetical examples, as there is no evidence in 
the record connected with events in June.  (See R.)  Moreover, events in June 
would have taken place more than two months after the altercation at issue.  
(See R., p. 7.) 
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a reservation of further ruling—was not adverse to Bobolack, and is therefore not 
appealable. 
 Bobolack characterizes the magistrate’s ruling as a “partial grant” of the 
state’s motion, and contends that the magistrate “excluded specific evidence 
supporting Ms. Bobolack’s characterization of her state of mind as one of fear 
and standing up to a bully.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)  But this incorrectly 
inverts the substance of what the court did: the magistrate expressly allowed 
Bobolack to introduce the type of evidence the state wanted excluded, and 
Bobolack indeed explored the stalking allegations at length at trial.  (See, e.g., 
Tr., p. 13, Ls. 15-22; p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23.)  Moreover, Bobolack’s point 
fails because she interprets a reservation of ruling as an adverse ruling.  With 
the unobjected-to exception of excluding actual police reports, the magistrate 
reserved ruling on what evidence would be out-of-bounds, and that boundary line 
was never meaningfully explored by the parties.  Save for sustained objections 
over alleged stalking acts that occurred after the incident at issue, the state did 
not renew its objection to exclude the stalking evidence at trial.2  (See Tr., p. 129, 
Ls. 14-24; p. 154, L. 16 – p. 155, L. 3; p. 160, L. 13 – p. 161, L. 9.)   
                                            
2 Bobolack did not specifically claim in her offer of proof that she intended to 
introduce evidence regarding Melissa Gayhart’s car, which was alleged to have 
been vandalized after the bowling-alley incident.  (See Tr., p. 10, L. 10 – p. 11, 
L. 8.)  At trial,  the magistrate repeatedly sustained the state’s objection to 
exclude testimony pertaining to post-incident stalking and vandalism. 
(Tr., p. 129, Ls. 14-24; p. 154, L. 16 – p. 155, L. 3; p. 160, L. 13 – p. 161, L. 9.)  
Though the state’s motion only sought to exclude alleged evidence of “the 
Defendant’s property” being vandalized (R., p. 37), Bobolack appears to now 
raise this issue on appeal, claiming that the magistrate erred by excluding “the 
circumstances surrounding the vandalizing of Ms. [Gayhart’s] car.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 6.)  To the extent Bobolack means to challenge this ruling, that argument 
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As a result, Bobolack was able to present state-of-mind evidence, stalking 
evidence, vandalism evidence, harassment evidence, death-threat evidence, 
threats-to-pets evidence, damaged-radiator evidence, and more.  (See, e.g.,  Tr., 
p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 142, Ls. 2-17.)  This testimony was elicited without 
objection from the state, and the magistrate accordingly had no occasion to “shut 
that part down.”  Bobolack was successfully able to admit all of the pre-incident 
stalking evidence her counsel inquired about, which shows that the magistrate 
did not adversely rule to exclude this evidence, but simply reserved—but did not 
exercise—his ability to limit its scope. 
 In sum, the magistrate effectively denied the state’s motion to the extent it 
allowed the stalking evidence to come in, excluded police reports without 
objection, and reserved ruling further on the scope of the stalking evidence.  
Bobolack has not shown this ruling was adverse to her, and she consequently 
cannot appeal from the magistrate’s ruling on the state’s motion in limine. 
                                                                                                                                  
would fail, because she has not supported it on appeal—that is, she has not 
explained, even assuming the relevance of pre-incident stalking, how alleged 
stalking that occurred after the incident in question could also be relevant.  See  
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on 
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will 
not be considered . . . . A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority 
or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.”).  Alternatively, to the extent 
this argument has been preserved, it fails, because an alleged post-incident 
encounter was necessarily irrelevant to Bobolack’s pre-incident state of mind, 
and was correctly excluded at trial.  See I.R.E. 401. 
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D. Even If The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse To Bobolack, She Failed To 
Make An Offer Of Proof Of Any Evidence That Was Excluded At Trial, 
And Therefore Failed To Preserve A Record For Appealing The 
Magistrate’s Ruling 
 
Parties may not predicate an error on a court’s decision to exclude 
evidence “unless a substantial right of the party is affected,” and “the substance 
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked.”  I.R.E. 103.  Generally speaking, 
“[t]he purpose of an offer of proof is to make a record either for appeal or to 
enable the court to rule on the admissibility of proffered evidence.”  State v. 
Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 82, 175 P.3d 764, 771 (2007).  Absent such an offer of 
proof or a record-based indication of the relevancy of the excluded evidence, an 
issue will not be preserved for appeal.  See State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 120, 
29 P.3d 949, 956 (2001) (citing Morris By & Through Morris v. Thomson, 
130 Idaho 138, 143, 937 P.2d 1212, 1217 (1997) (“Plaintiff, however, did not 
make an offer of proof regarding the testimony she intended to elicit from 
Dr. Watkins on re-direct, and we thus do not have any basis on which to rule.”)). 
 In its motion to exclude the stalking evidence, the state noted that “[i]n an 
offer of proof, it is expected that the defense will attempt to elicit testimony from 
the Defendant or other witnesses that on prior occasions, the victim has stalked 
the Defendant, harassed and/or threatened the Defendant, or vandalized the 
Defendant’s property.”  (R., p. 38.)  Bobolack’s response elaborated that these 
types of evidence were “closely related in that they revolve around the victim’s 
actions, before and after the incident at issue, towards Ms. Bobolack’s ending a 
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romantic relationship with a friend of the victim.”  (R., p. 41.)  Bobolack further 
elaborated: 
Ms. Bobolack acted without malice. Rather, Ms. Bobolack acted out 
of self-preservation, attempting simply to put an end to the victim’s 
constant harassment and stalking which was so pervasive that 
Ms. Bobolack lived in a constant state of fear, a prisoner in her own 
home. The “stalking” evidence makes it less probable that 
Ms. Bobolack acted with the requisite specific intent of malice. 
 
(R., p. 41.) 
 The magistrate pressed for more detail about this evidence while hearing 
the motion in limine, essentially asking for an offer of proof: “[C]ertainly, you have 
a right to get into there’s a history between these folks, and they don’t like each 
other, or whatever is going on here, but tell me how deeply you propose to get 
into that?”  (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-25.)  The magistrate reiterated he was not asking for 
a “legal analysis,” but was rather asking Bobolack’s counsel “what is it that you 
intend to inquire about.”  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-8.)  Bobolack’s counsel responded: 
The fact that the alleged victim is a – a close relation to 
Ms. Bobolack’s ex, the fact that the alleged victim has made 
physical threats against the defendant, has threatened to kill the – 
defendant’s pets. It’s Ms. Bobolack’s testimony that during this 
verbal altercation, the alleged victim made specific and repeated 
reference to getting car number eight. Ms. Bobolack has had 
exactly seven cars vandalized since she broke up with the alleged 
victim’s acquaintance. 
 
Very specific threats, Your Honor. There – there is so much more 
going on here, and the State wants to draw a box around one – 
one little incident here. There is so much more going on here, and 
all of this goes to the frame of mind of the defendant, as far as – I 
understand the State’s concern about not wanting to put on officer 
testimony about the [veracity], necessarily, of Ms. Bobolack’s 
accusations. But, Your Honor, they aren’t being offered at all for the 
truth of the statement, per se. They absolutely go to Ms. Bobolack’s 
mind frame on this day. And that is absolutely relevant where the 
State has to prove that she acted with malice. 
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Her mind frame on this day is one of self-preservation, is one of 
fear, and that is absolutely relevant. 
 
(Tr., p. 10, L. 10 – p. 11, L. 8.) 
 Here, regardless of whether the magistrate’s ruling was adverse to 
Bobolack, she has not preserved a challenge to it on appeal, because every 
factual area she proposed delving into prior to trial, was ultimately discussed, at 
length, at trial.  Accordingly, she did not make an offer of proof of any evidence 
that was actually excluded at trial. 
 All of the evidence Bobolack stated she intended to inquire about was 
presented at trial.  To summarize, Bobolack testified at trial that: Giambruno said 
“[w]e can’t wait until we get our hands on vehicle number eight” (Tr., p. 123, 
Ls. 21-24); that Bobolack had seven cars previously vandalized, and she 
suspected Giambruno was responsible (Tr., p. 124, Ls. 3-5; p. 141, L. 21 – 
p. 142, L. 4); that Bobolack ended a relationship with a friend of Giambruno 
(Tr,. p. 137, Ls. 1-13); that Giambruno threatened to kill her pets (Tr., p. 126, 
Ls. 13-16; p. 138, Ls. 15-17); that Giambruno threatened to kill her five times 
(Tr., p. 137, L. 24 – p. 138, L. 1); that she was stalked by Giambruno (Tr., p. 138, 
Ls. 7-12); that for over four years she had left grocery stores, parks, and movie 
theaters to avoid Giambruno (Tr., p. 139, Ls. 20-24); that she lived in fear of 
Giambruno (Tr., p. 140, Ls. 18-23); that she called police 90 times regarding 
various threats (Tr., p. 141, Ls. 1-3); that she possessed videotape evidence of 
Giambruno’s vandalism and harassment (Tr., p. 141, Ls. 24 – p. 142, L. 7); that 
Giambruno was part of a group that “sever[ed] my radiator” (Tr., p. 142, Ls. 12-
17); and that Bobolack feared for her life (Tr., p. 144, Ls. 19-24). 
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Bobolack’s other witness similarly testified that she allegedly heard 
Giambruno threaten to kill Bobolack (Tr., p. 159, Ls. 12-21); that Bobolack lived 
in fear from Giambruno—fearful for her cars, friends, family members, and pets 
(Tr., p. 154, Ls. 1-15); and that the witness had “called the Meridian Police 
Department” regarding the aforementioned death threat  (Tr., p. 159, Ls. 19-23). 
Moreover, Bobolack did not simply allude to or summarize these 
allegations—she testified about them at length and in great detail: 
Q [from defense counsel]. Had you ever had a car vandalized 
before you broke up with Ms. Dickson? 
 
A [from Bobolack]. No. 
 
Q. Has Ms. Giambruno threatened to kill you? 
 
A. Yes, she has, on five occasions. 
 
Q. Is Ms. Giambruno stalking you? 
 
A. She has. And I believe that – you know, that was just an 
altercation at the – at the bowling alley just to be a bully. 
 
Q. Has Ms. Giambruno threatened to kill your dogs? 
 
A. She’s threatened to do a lot, and my dogs is one of them. 
 








Q. Are your dogs your children? 
 
A. Yes, they are. 
 




A. Yes, I do. I stay regularly; I limit myself of going anywhere. 
 
Q. Do you limit your life and calendar out of fear of what 
Ms. Giambruno might do to your pets? 
 
A. Not just Ms. Giambruno, but Robin Dickson, and Rory Brewer 
and them, yes. 
 








Q. Do you feel you live as a prisoner because of the potential harm 
that Ms. Giambruno can inflict? 
 
A. After 4.5 years being harassed by this group, I do. And I fear for 
Melissa and her children as well. 
 
Q. Are you fearful when you leave your home? 
 
A. Yes. I have really high anxiety. And right now, my animals are 
being watched while I’ve been here all day. 
 
Q. Have you called the police regarding Ms. Giambruno? 
 
A. Yes, I have. 
 
Q. How many times? 
 
A. I’d probably say 90 in the last 4.5 years, over threats and – and 
being harassed. 
 
Q. Have the police ever come to you to investigate further? 
 









A. Because I felt that there was no other way. I felt like I had to 
stand my ground and tell her to leave me alone. I’ve had enough. 
Somebody’s stalking you for 4.5 years, what do you do? When the 
police don’t do nothing about seven vandalizing, stalking your 
home, and you’ve moved five times, and this same group comes at 
you at all five homes, what do you do? Enough’s enough. 
 
I have the right just like everybody else, underneath the 
Constitution, I have a right to a peaceful and safeful [sic] dwelling, 
and be not harassed. But that’s not the case. I’ve lived like this for 
4.5 years, like a prisoner, because of this group. 
 
(Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p.128, L. 23 (brackets altered).) 
In sum, all of the stalking evidence that Bobolack identified prior to trial 
was ultimately heard at trial—repeatedly, and in detail.  Bobolack was able to 
delve into a four-year history of her side of the story, and testify regarding every 
incident and category of stalking evidence she identified in her offer of proof.  As 
a result, she has failed to show that there was any evidence she presented as an 
offer of proof that was actually excluded at trial.   
 Bobolack contends that the magistrate permitted only “limited inquiry into 
Ms. Bobolack’s general state of mind,” and claims it was an error to exclude 
“specific factual underpinnings” of that state of mind.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  
This argument fails, as the magistrate plainly allowed Bobolack and her witness 
to testify both about her state of mind and the many alleged specific facts that 
underpinned it—a cornucopia of allegations that included vandalized cars, a 
breakup, living in fear, being stalked, living as a prisoner in her own home, 
endangered pets, dozens of unheeded police calls, death threats, a severed 
radiator, and videotaped vandalism.  (Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, 
L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24.)   
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Bobolack also argues that “[i]t is far different to be limited to stating ‘I have 
been bullied[,’] as opposed to being able to relate a story, a narrative, of the 
incidents of bullying, of the actual root causes of the fear.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 6.)  The problem with this scenario is it ponders the opposite of what 
happened here.  The magistrate did not constrain Bobolack to stating “I have 
been bullied,” nor did it prevent her from relating the story, narrative, and 
incidents that she alleged informed her mental state.  (See Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – 
p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24.)   
To the contrary, the magistrate allowed Bobolack and her witness to 
present a detailed narrative discussing the alleged underlying incidents, which 
they did.  The narrative was exhaustive.  By the time it concluded, the jury heard 
allegations of how many times Bobolack’s car had been vandalized, how many 
death threats had been made, how many homes Bobolack had lived in with 
Giambruno “com[ing] at [her],” how many times police had been called, how 
many fearful years had transpired, the exact kind of vandalism that was inflicted 
on Bobolack’s radiator, whether Bobolack had video taped some of the stalking 
evidence, whether Bobolack’s pets were being watched during the trial for their 
own safety, and for good measure, precisely how many dogs Bobolack owned.  
(See Tr.,p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24.)  Bobolack was 
not remotely limited to testifying solely about state-of-mind evidence, but was 
permitted to testify to fact after abundant fact supporting her state of mind. 
In sum, all the evidence that Bobolack identified in her offer of proof was 
ultimately admitted.  Because she did not make an offer of proof showing any 
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evidence that was excluded, she has not preserved her challenge to the 
magistrate’s ruling on the motion in limine. 
E. Alternatively, Even If The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse And Properly 
Preserved For Review, The District Court Correctly Affirmed The 
Magistrate’s Decision To Exclude Evidence That Was Unfairly Prejudicial, 
Confusing, Or Needlessly Cumulative 
 
To analyze whether evidence is admissible under I.R.E. 403, courts must 
perform a balancing test and ask “whether the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”  State v. Grist, 
147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  Specifically, “[a]lthough relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”  I.R.E. 403.  If a piece of evidence’s potential for “unfair 
prejudice” substantially outweighs its probative value, it can be excluded. 
I.R.E. 403.  “Unfair prejudice” is the tendency to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis.  See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 
(2010). 
Here, the state sought to exclude the stalking evidence because even 
assuming its relevance, “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice and the danger of confusing the issues and/or 
misleading the jury.”3  (R., p. 39.) 
                                            
3 The state also sought to exclude the evidence as irrelevant per I.R.E. 402. 
(R., pp. 38-39.) 
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To the extent the magistrate’s ruling limiting potential testimony was 
adverse to Bobolack, it appears that the ruling was grounded in Rule 403 
concerns.  The magistrate was adamant that, 
I’ll give [the parties] some latitude to – to go back and forth on [the 
issue of the stalking evidence], but we’re not going to have, you 
know, a three-hour sub-trial on – on who’s at fault in a – in a 
domestic situation gone bad. That’s not going to be – that’s not on 
the table today, so. 
 
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 9-14.)  On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed this 
basis for the magistrate’s ruling: 
It is clear that the trial judge’s ruling was intended to avoid a 
subordinate trial on each of the claimed wrongs towards the 
appellant allegedly committed by the victim in this case. In fact, as 
the trial progressed the history of ill will sought to explain the 
appellant’s state of mind was revealed. The trial judge’s expressed 
intent to avoid seven or more mini trials within the trial while 
allowing exposure of the underlying claims was achieved. 
 
(R., p. 138.) 
 The magistrate correctly concluded that stalking evidence testimony 
should at some point be limited, in order to avoid conducting sub-trials; or in 
other words, to avoid undue prejudice, confusion, or wasting time.  Even 
assuming for the sake of argument that stalking evidence would be relevant to 
Bobolack’s state of mind, she was already allowed to present copious stalking 
evidence at trial.  (See, e.g., Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; p. 137, L. 24 – 
p. 144, L. 24; p. 153, L. 23 – p. 154, L. 15; p. 159, Ls. 12-23.)  Bobolack was 
given the ability to explore these issues in detail, and to allow further stalking 
evidence, without limitation, would go precisely where the magistrate wanted to 
avoid—into trials within the trial over specific alleged instances of vandalism 
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occurring on specific dates in time.  Sub-trials would have been self-evidently 
confusing, wasteful, time-consuming, and prejudicial, especially given that 
Bobolack ably made her point that she was afraid of Giambruno, and adduced 
facts to support it.  Even assuming the magistrate’s ruling was adverse to 
Bobolack, the outer limits set by the magistrate were proper.  Bobolack thus fails 
to show that the magistrate’s ruling on the motion in limine was incorrect. 
F. Alternatively, Even Assuming The Magistrate’s Ruling Was Adverse, 
Properly Preserved For Review, And Erroneous, The Error Was Harmless 
 
Finally, even if the magistrate erred by ruling on the state’s motion in 
limine,  any such error was harmless.  “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected ….”  I.R.E. 103(a).  “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  “An error is 
harmless if a reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged 
evidence.”  State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 887, 119 P.3d 653, 662 
(Ct. App. 2005). 
Here, Bobolack was able to adduce substantial, detailed testimonial 
evidence alleging living in fear of Giambruno, being stalked by Giambruno, 
fearing for her life, fearing for her family’s and friends’ and pets’ safety, calling 
the police 90 times, having her property vandalized, moving from home to home 
with the “same group” coming at her, resorting to having “my animals [] being 
watched” during the trial itself, and living like a prisoner in her own home—and 
yet was still found guilty of disturbing the peace.  (Tr., p. 126, L. 4 – p. 128, L. 23; 
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p. 137, L. 24 – p. 144, L. 24; p. 193, Ls. 5-8.)  Bobolack has not made any 
showing that the production of more of the exact same allegations—except with 
more detail—would have made a difference in the jury’s verdict, given the 
testimony it had already heard. 
Further, Bobolack herself diminishes the magnitude of any error when she 
concludes that whether the stalking allegations even occurred is irrelevant—she 
states that “[t]he veracity of these allegations was not relevant, because such 
allegations formed the basis of Ms. Bobolack’s state of mind with regard to 
Ms. Giambruno, whether the allegations were actually true or false.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 6; see also Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-3.)   
If that is the case—if stalking evidence would only be relevant insofar as it 
“formed the basis” of Bobolack’s state of mind—then the exclusion of additional 
stalking evidence would necessarily be harmless.  As it happened, Bobolack 
already produced ample factual allegations to support her state-of-mind 
argument.  Accordingly, excluding further cumulative allegations—whose 
relevance stemmed not from whether they actually happened, but from their 
effect on Bobolack’s already-supported state of mind—would be a harmless 
error, if error at all. 
Here, even if the magistrate’s ruling was adverse to Bobolack, properly 









 Bobolack argues that “[t]he jury’s verdict was unsupported by sufficient 
evidence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  She points to her own testimony “that she 
was not willfully attempting to inflict harm on Ms. Giambruno,” and contends 
there is insufficient evidence that she “acted with the requisite willful malice.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 This argument fails, as there was ample evidence from which the jury 
could conclude that Bobolack maliciously and willfully disturbed Giambruno’s 
peace or quiet.  The district court correctly affirmed that conclusion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.”  State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011).  Idaho’s 
appellate courts will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 
 
 23 
955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 
(Ct. App. 1991).  Furthermore, the facts and inferences to be drawn from those 
facts are construed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”  Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 
1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
C. There Was Sufficient Evidence That Bobolack Maliciously And Willfully 
Disturbed The Peace 
 
 Idaho Code § 18-6409(1) sets forth the elements of disturbing the peace: 
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or 
quiet of any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual 
noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, 
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any 
gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language 
within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous 
manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
Here, Bobolack was charged with “willfully and maliciously disturb[ing] the 
peace or quiet of a person, Sara Giambruno, by engaging in offensive conduct in 
a loud and boisterous manner.”  (R., pp. 44-45.)  She was found guilty after a 
jury trial, and the district court reviewed the facts adduced at trial on intermediate 
appeal.  (R., pp. 139-142.)  After doing so the district court concluded that: 
In essence the jury was presented with differing versions of what 
transpired during the incident. It appears the jury credited the 
testimony of the witnesses for the State and did not believe the 
witnesses for the defense, including the appellant’s assertion that 
her only motivation in yelling at Ms. Giambruno was “to get her to 
stop.” The jury’s guilty verdict is supported by substantial evidence 
and will not be second guessed.  
 
(R., p. 143.) 
 
 The district court correctly affirmed the jury verdict, as there was ample 
evidence that Bobolack maliciously and willfully disturbed Giambruno’s peace or 
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quiet.  Giambruno testified that as she left her apartment with her son, Bobolack 
began yelling and screaming at her from across the street.  (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 4-11.)  
Giambruno testified that Bobolack “was calling me you fat bitch, and I had it 
coming, and that she was going to kick my ass.”  (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 19-23.)  
Giamburno testified that Bobolack was “yelling and her arms were waving,” and 
that she believed that Bobolack was looking for an altercation, and appeared 
aggressive.  (Tr., p. 57, Ls. 11-13; p. 58, Ls. 2-3, 14-17.)  An eyewitness testified 
that “[t]here was two females out in the parking lot, and one was yelling at the 
other one.”  (Tr., p. 69, L. 23 – p. 70, L. 1.)  He testified that only one woman was 
yelling, and that the woman he observed yelling was Bobolack.  (Tr., p. 70, Ls. 4-
8; p. 76, Ls. 1-8.)  The eyewitness further testified that Bobolack was “yelling 
pretty much at the top of her voice,” “bad mouthing the other lady, calling her a 
lot of profanities.”  (Tr., p. 70, Ls. 16-22.)  He testified that Bobolack called 
Giambruno “a bitch, called her a cunt; pretty much it was all just cuss – cuss 
words all the way across.”  (Tr., p. 70, L. 25 – p. 71, L. 2.)  Moreover, he testified 
that Bobolack made threatening statements; “[s]he’d made the comment to come 
back and talk to her, kind of – I think she said, come on, bitch, as in like come 
back and talk to her.”  (Tr., p. 71, Ls. 3-11.)  He concluded that Bobolack “just 
kept yelling and screaming,” whereas Giambruno “was just walking away,” and 
estimated that Bobolack was yelling at Giambruno from three to five minutes. 




evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that Bobolack disturbed the peace.4 
 Bobolack argues that this verdict was unsupported, and contends her own 
testimony regarding her mental state was “uncontroverted.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 8.)  She in particular cites her own testimony: 
Ms. Bobolack testified unequivocally that she was not willfully 
attempting to inflict harm on Ms. Giambruno: 
 




(Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing Tr., p. 128, L. 24 – p. 129, L. 1).) 
 
 This argument fails.  Testimony from Bobolack, favorable though it may 
be to her case, does not negate the substantial evidence before the jury that she 
alone was aggressively screaming and yelling at Giambruno for minutes on end, 
swearing at her, and threatening her.  Bobolack points out evidence that 
supports her story, but does not show an absence of evidence on the other side, 
let alone meaningfully address the evidence that she maliciously and willfully 
disturbed the peace.  The jury had substantial evidence to conclude that 
Bobolack was guilty of disturbing the peace and the district court correctly 
affirmed the same. 
                                            
4 Moreover, “direct evidence of intent is not required.”  See State v. Mitchell, 
146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008). Per Mitchell, intent “may 
be shown by circumstantial evidence, or proven by the defendant’s acts and 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 6th day of October, 2016. 
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